Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs' Defection Tests Tenth Schedule's Anti-Defection Provisions

Indian Express - Explained · 20 Jun 2026 · 2 min read
Prelims · Polity Mains · GS2 Polity and constitution High relevance

Six Shiv Sena (UBT) Lok Sabha MPs are likely to defect to the Eknath Shinde faction, raising constitutional questions under the Tenth Schedule's anti-defection law since the 'split' defence was removed by the 91st Amendment in 2003.

Key points

Tenth Schedule of the Constitution penalizes defection when legislators shift allegiance, with disqualification provisions under Paragraph 2 for voluntarily giving up party membership or voting against party directives.

Paragraph 4 allows exemption from disqualification only if two-thirds of the legislature party agrees to a merger with another party, a critical provision being tested in the Shiv Sena (UBT) case.

The 91st Amendment (2003) removed Paragraph 3, which previously protected splits involving one-third of legislators, making defection harder to justify legally.

Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) emphasized that the Speaker must determine the 'real political party' based on party constitution and leadership structure, not just legislative majority.

[GS2-Polity] This case connects to GS2's 'Parliament and State Legislatures' syllabus by testing the anti-defection law's effectiveness in maintaining party discipline and democratic integrity.

Girish Chodankar v. The Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly (2022) upheld that two-thirds majority mergers are protected under Paragraph 4, a precedent relevant to the Shiv Sena (UBT) defections.

Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Arvind Sawant preemptively wrote to Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, citing the 2023 Supreme Court judgment to block recognition of any rebel faction without party consent.

[GS3-Governance] The defection crisis highlights institutional challenges in enforcing the anti-defection law, raising questions about political stability and ethical governance in Maharashtra.

Way Forward: Strengthen the Tenth Schedule by mandating time-bound Speaker decisions on disqualification, introducing penalties for frivolous mergers, and empowering the Election Commission to verify party constitutions during splits.

Key terms

Paragraph 4 (Tenth Schedule)

Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule provides an exemption from disqualification if not less than two-thirds of a legislature party agrees to merge with another party. This provision is critical in cases like the Shiv Sena (UBT) defection, where rebels claim merger protection.

Tenth Schedule

The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, added by the 52nd Amendment in 1985, contains anti-defection laws to prevent elected members from switching parties arbitrarily. It mandates disqualification for voluntarily giving up party membership or voting against party directives, with limited exceptions for mergers approved by two-thirds of the legislature party.

91st Amendment (2003)

The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, removed Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, which previously allowed one-third of a party's legislators to split without disqualification. This amendment tightened anti-defection provisions to curb political instability caused by frequent defections.

Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023)

A landmark Supreme Court judgment that clarified the Speaker's role in determining the 'real political party' during factional disputes. It ruled that the decision must be based on the party's constitution and leadership structure, not just legislative majority, reinforcing the anti-defection law's intent.